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Repeated games have provided an explanation how
mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection
is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner’s
dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant
strategies have substantially been investigated in
evolutionary game theory. The original memory-one
zero-determinant strategies unilaterally enforce linear
relations between average payoffs of players. Here, we
extend the concept of zero-determinant strategies to
memory-two strategies in repeated games. Memory-
two zero-determinant strategies unilaterally enforce
linear relations between correlation functions of
payoffs and payoffs at the previous round. Examples
of memory-two zero-determinant strategy in the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game are provided,
some of which generalize the Tit-for-Tat strategy
to memory-two case. Extension of zero-determinant
strategies to memory-n case with n≥ 2 is also
straightforward.
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Repeated games offer a framework explaining forward-looking behaviors and reciprocity of
rational agents [1,2]. Since it was pointed out that game theory of rational agents can be applied
to evolutionary behavior of populations of biological systems [3], evolutionary game theory has
investigated the condition where mutualism is maintained in conflicts [4–11]. In the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game, it was found that, although there are many equilibria, none of them
are evolutionary stable due to neutral drift [12]. Because rationality of each biological individual
is bounded, evolutionary stability of strategies whose length of memory is one has mainly been
focused on in evolutionary game theory. However, memory-one strategies contain several useful
strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma game, such as the Grim trigger strategy [13], the Tit-for-
Tat (TFT) strategy [14–17], and the Win-stay Lose-shift (WSLS) strategy [5], which can form
cooperative Nash equilibria.
In 2012, Press and Dyson discovered a novel class of memory-one strategies called zero-
determinant (ZD) strategies [18]. ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between
average payoffs of players. ZD strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma game contain the equalizer
strategy which unilaterally sets the average payoff of the opponent, and the extortionate strategy
by which the player can gain the greater average payoff than the opponent. After their work,
evolutionary stability of ZD strategies in prisoner’s dilemma game has been investigated by
several authors [19–24]. Furthermore, the concept of ZD strategies has been extended to multi-
player multi-action games [25–29]. Linera algebraic properties of ZD strategies in general
multi-player multi-action games with many ZD players were also investigated in Ref. [30],
which found that possible ZD strategies are constrained by the consistency of the linear payoff
relations. Another extension is ZD strategies in repeated games with imperfect monitoring [30–
32], where possible ZD strategies are more restricted than ones in perfect monitoring case.
Furthermore, ZD strategies were also extended to repeated games with discounting factor [28,33–
35] and asymmetric games [36]. Performance of ZD strategies such as the extortionate strategy
and the generous ZD strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma game has also been investigated
in human experiments [37–39]. Moreover, behavior of the extortionate strategy in structured
populations was found to be quite different from that in well-mixed populations [40,41]. Although
ZD strategies are not necessarily rational strategy, they contain the TFT strategy in prisoner’s
dilemma game [18], which returns the opponent’s previous action, and accordingly ZD strategies
form a significant class of memory-one strategies.
Recently, properties of longer memory strategies have been investigated in the context
of repeated games with implementation errors [42–45]. In general, longer memory enables
complicated behavior [46]. Especially, it has been shown that, in prisoner’s dilemma game,
a memory-two strategy called Tit-for-Tat-Anti-Tit-for-Tat (TFT-ATFT) is successful under
implementation errors [42]. Although TFT-ATFT normally behaves as TFT, it switches to anti-
TFT (ATFT) when it recognizes an error, and then returns to TFT when mutual cooperation is
achieved or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice. In Ref. [45], a successful strategy in
memory-three class which can easily be interpreted has also been proposed. Recall that original
memory-one TFT strategy, which is also successful but is not robust against errors, is a special case
of memory-one ZD strategies. Therefore, discussion of longer-memory strategies in the context of
ZD strategies would be useful. However, the concept of ZD strategies has not been extended to
longer-memory strategies.
In this paper, we extend the concept of ZD strategies to memory-two strategies in repeated
games. Memory-two ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between correlation
functions of payoffs at present round and payoffs at the previous round. We provide examples of
memory-two ZD strategy in repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. Particularly, one of the examples
can be regarded as an extension of TFT strategy to memory-two case.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a model of repeated game with










section 4, we provide examples of memory-two ZD strategies in repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game. In section 5, extension of ZD strategies to memory-n case with n≥ 2 is discussed. Section
6 is devoted to concluding remarks.
2. Model
We consider N -player repeated game. Action of player a∈ {1, · · · , N} is described as σa ∈
{1, · · · ,M}. We collectively denote state σ := (σ1, · · · , σN ). We consider the situation that the
length of memory of strategies of all players are at most two. (We will see in section 6 that this





of taking acton σa when states at last round and second-
to-last round are σ′ and σ′′, respectively. Let sa(σ) be payoffs of player a when state is σ. The





















is joint distribution of the present state σ and the last state σ′ at time t, and we

















. We consider the situation that the discounting factor
is δ= 1 [1].
3. Memory-two zero-determinant strategies

































(st) (σ′′,σ′) . (3.2)















































for arbitrary σa. This is the extension of Akin’s lemma [25,28,30,47,48] to memory-two case. (We
remark that the term δσa,σ′a is regarded as memory-one strategy “Repeat”, which repeats the






as a Press-Dyson (PD) matrix.































































αb,c ⟨sb (σ(t+ 1)) sc (σ(t))⟩(st) , (3.7)
where ⟨· · · ⟩(st) represents average with respect to the stationary distribution P (st). This is the
extension of the concept of zero-determinant strategies to memory-two case. We remark that the
original (memory-one) ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between average payoffs
of players at the stationary state. Here, memory-two ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear
relations between correlation functions of payoffs at present round and payoffs at the previous
round at the stationary state. (It should be noted that the quantity ⟨sb (σ(t+ 1)) sc (σ(t))⟩(st) does
not depend on t in the stationary state.) We note that because the number of the components of
a PD matrix is M2N and the number of payoff tensors sb ⊗ sc in Eq. (3.6) is (N + 1)2, the space
of memory-two ZD strategies is small even for the prisoner’s dilemma game (N = 2 and M = 2),
and most of memory-two strategies are not memory-two ZD strategies. In addition, although we
choose sb ⊗ sc as a basis in the right-hand side of Eq. (3.6), such choice is not necessary and we
can choose another functions [49].
















This uniquely determines the stationary distribution of a single state σ′.


















4. Examples: Repeated prisoner’s dilemma
Here, we consider two-player two-action prisoner’s dilemma game [18]. Actions of two players
are 1 (cooperation) or 2 (defection). Payoffs of two players sa := (sa(σ)) are s1 = (R,S, T, P ) and










(a) Example 1: Relating correlation function with average payoffs
We consider the situation that player 1 takes the following memory-two strategy:
T1 (1) :=

T1(1|1, 1, 1, 1) T1(1|1, 1, 1, 2) T1(1|1, 1, 2, 1) T1(1|1, 1, 2, 2)
T1(1|1, 2, 1, 1) T1(1|1, 2, 1, 2) T1(1|1, 2, 2, 1) T1(1|1, 2, 2, 2)
T1(1|2, 1, 1, 1) T1(1|2, 1, 1, 2) T1(1|2, 1, 2, 1) T1(1|2, 1, 2, 2)



















0 0 0 0
 . (4.1)
(We have assumed that T − P ≥ P − S. For the case T − P <P − S, a slight modification is
needed.) Then, we find that her Press-Dyson matrix is
T̂1 (1) =

T1(1|1, 1, 1, 1)− 1 T1(1|1, 1, 1, 2)− 1 T1(1|1, 1, 2, 1)− 1 T1(1|1, 1, 2, 2)− 1
T1(1|1, 2, 1, 1)− 1 T1(1|1, 2, 1, 2)− 1 T1(1|1, 2, 2, 1)− 1 T1(1|1, 2, 2, 2)− 1
T1(1|2, 1, 1, 1) T1(1|2, 1, 1, 2) T1(1|2, 1, 2, 1) T1(1|2, 1, 2, 2)




































and that this strategy is memory-two ZD strategy which unilaterally enforces
0 = ⟨s2 (σ(t+ 1)) s1 (σ(t))⟩(st) − S ⟨s2⟩(st) − P ⟨s1⟩(st) + PS. (4.4)
Therefore, the correlation function ⟨s2 (σ(t+ 1)) s1 (σ(t))⟩(st) is related to the average payoffs
⟨s1⟩(st) and ⟨s2⟩(st) by the ZD strategy.
We provide numerical results about this linear relation. We set parameters (R,S, T, P ) =
(3, 0, 5, 1). Strategy of player 2 is set to
T2 (1) :=

T2(1|1, 1, 1, 1) T2(1|1, 1, 1, 2) T2(1|1, 1, 2, 1) T2(1|1, 1, 2, 2)
T2(1|1, 2, 1, 1) T2(1|1, 2, 1, 2) T2(1|1, 2, 2, 1) T2(1|1, 2, 2, 2)
T2(1|2, 1, 1, 1) T2(1|2, 1, 1, 2) T2(1|2, 1, 2, 1) T2(1|2, 1, 2, 2)






























and we change q in the range [0, 1]. (Note that the strategy of player 2 is essentially memory-one.)
Actions of both players at t= 0 and t= 1 are sampled from uniform distribution. In Fig. 1, we
display the result of numerical simulation of one sample, where average is calculated by time

























Figure 1. Time-averaged payoffs of two players
∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) /t and correlation functions∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) sb (σ(t
′ − 1)) /t with t= 100000 for various q when strategy of player 1 is given by Eq.
(4.1). The red line corresponds to the right-hand side of Eq. (4.4).
(b) Example 2: Extended Tit-for-Tat strategy
Here, we introduce a memory-two ZD strategy which can be called as extended Tit-for-Tat (ETFT)
strategy. We consider the situation that player 1 takes the following memory-two strategy:
T1 (1) =










0 0 0 0
 . (4.6)
Note that this does not depend on the concrete values of payoffs (R,S, T, P ). Then, we find that
her PD matrix is
T̂1 (1) =

0 0 0 0































Therefore, it is memory-two ZD strategy, which enforces
0 = ⟨s1 (σ(t+ 1)) s2 (σ(t))⟩(st) + ⟨s2 (σ(t+ 1)) s1 (σ(t))⟩(st)










1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1


























Figure 2. Time-averaged payoffs of two players
∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) /t and correlation functions∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) sb (σ(t
′ − 1)) /t with t= 100000 for various q when strategy of player 1 is given by Eq.
(4.6). The red line corresponds to the right-hand side of Eq. (4.9).
enforces ⟨s1⟩(st) = ⟨s2⟩(st) [18], Eq. (4.6) can be regarded as an extension of Tit-for-Tat strategy.
We provide numerical results about the ETFT strategy. Parameters and strategies of player 2
are set to the same values as those in the previous subsection. In Fig. 2, we display the result of
numerical simulation of one sample. We can check that the linear relation (4.9) seems to hold for
all q.
We can understand feelings of ETFT player as follows. We find that, when the previous state
is (1, 1) or (2, 2), ETFT behaves as TFT. When the previous state and the second-to-last state are
(σ′,σ′′) = ((1, 2), (1, 1)) or ((2, 1), (1, 1)), ETFT regards that one of the players mistakes his/her
action, and returns action 1 (cooperation) or 2 (defection) at random. Similarly, when the previous
state and the second-to-last state are ((1, 2), (2, 2)) or ((2, 1), (2, 2)), ETFT also regards that one of
the players mistakes his/her action, and returns action 1 or 2 at random. When the previous
state and the second-to-last state are ((1, 2), (1, 2)), ETFT ceases to cooperate and returns action 2.
When the previous state and the second-to-last state are ((2, 1), (2, 1)), ETFT continues to exploit
and returns action 2. Finally, when the previous state and the second-to-last state are ((1, 2), (2, 1))




1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
 , (4.11)
which is deterministic, ETFT may be successful because ETFT has several properties in common
with TFT-ATFT. Furthermore, since ETFT is stochastic, it may be robust against implementation
errors. Evolutionary stability of ETFT must be investigated in future.
It should be noted that a slightly modified version of ETFT
T1 (1) =




































Figure 3. Time-averaged payoffs of two players
∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) /t and correlation functions∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) sb (σ(t
′ − 1)) /t with t= 100000 for various q when strategy of player 1 is given by Eq.
(4.12). The red line corresponds to the right-hand side of Eq. (4.14).
is also a memory-two ZD strategy. We call this strategy as type-2 extended Tit-for-Tat (ETFT-2)





















which enforces a linear relation
0 = ⟨s1 (σ(t+ 1)) s2 (σ(t))⟩(st) + ⟨s2 (σ(t+ 1)) s1 (σ(t))⟩(st)






That is, the sign of the last term is different from that of ETFT. In Fig. 3, we also display the result
of numerical simulation of one sample, where parameters are set to the same values as before. We
can check that Eq. (4.14) holds for all q. Although ETFT-2 is similar to ETFT, it will be exploited by
All-D strategy (which always defects), because T1(1|1, 2, 1, 2) = 1. Therefore, it is expected that
ETFT-2 is less successful than ETFT.
(c) Example 3: Fickle Tit-for-Tat strategy
Here, we introduce another memory-two ZD strategy which can be called as fickle Tit-for-Tat
(FTFT) strategy. In this subsection, we assume 2R>T + S, which corresponds to the condition
that mutual cooperation is favorable than the period-two sequence (1, 2)→ (2, 1)→ (1, 2)→ · · ·
[18]. We consider the situation that player 1 takes the following memory-two strategy:
T1 (1) =

1 1 1 1




































Figure 4. Time-averaged payoffs of two players
∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) /t and correlation functions∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) sb (σ(t
′ − 1)) /t with t= 100000 for various q when strategy of player 1 is given by Eq.
(4.15). The red line corresponds to the right-hand side of Eq. (4.18).
Then, we find that her PD matrix is
T̂1 (1) =





























Therefore, it is also memory-two ZD strategy, which enforces
0 = ⟨s1 (σ(t+ 1)) s2 (σ(t))⟩(st) − ⟨s2 (σ(t+ 1)) s1 (σ(t))⟩(st)
+ ⟨s1 (σ(t+ 1)) s1 (σ(t))⟩(st) − ⟨s2 (σ(t+ 1)) s2 (σ(t))⟩(st) . (4.18)
This linear relation can be regarded as another type of fairness condition between two players.
One can compare the strategy matrix of FTFT (4.15) with that of TFT (4.10). FTFT can take a
different action from TFT with finite probability when the previous state is (1, 2) or (2, 1).
We provide numerical results about the FTFT strategy. Parameters and strategies of player 2
are set to the same values as those in the previous subsections. In Fig. 4, we display the result of
numerical simulation of one sample. We confirm that the linear relation (4.18) holds for all q.
(d) Example 4: Extended zero-sum strategy
Here we assume that 2R>T + S and 2P < T + S. In memory-one strategies, there exists the










1 1 1 1










where we have introduced

























Figure 5. Time-averaged payoffs of two players
∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) /t and correlation functions∑t
t′=1 sa (σ(t
′)) sb (σ(t
′ − 1)) /t with t= 100000 for various q when strategy of player 1 is given by Eq.
(4.23). The red line corresponds to the right-hand side of Eq. (4.25).














0 = ⟨s1⟩(st) + ⟨s2⟩(st) − (T + S). (4.22)
Since this relation means that the sum of average payoffs of two players is fixed, this ZD strategy
can be called as Zero-sum Strategy (ZSS).
















1 1 1 1


































Therefore, this strategy is a memory-two ZD strategy enforcing
0 = ⟨s1 (σ(t+ 1)) s1 (σ(t))⟩(st) + ⟨s2 (σ(t+ 1)) s2 (σ(t))⟩(st)






Because this strategy can be regarded as an extension of ZSS, we call this strategy as extended
Zero-sum Strategy (EZSS).
In Fig. 5, we display the result of numerical simulation of one sample, where parameters are











As in memory-one cases [18], possible memory-two ZD strategies are restricted by the sign of





























5. Extension to memory-n case
In this section, we discuss that extension of ZD strategies to memory-n (n≥ 2) case. By
using technique of this paper, extension of Akin’s lemma (3.5) to longer-memory case is
straightforward. Therefore, extension of the concept of ZD strategies to longer-memory case is
also straightforward. For memory-n case, the time evolution is described by the Markov chain
P
(











σ(−1), · · · ,σ(−n), t
)
(5.1)
with the transition probability
T
(







σa|σ(−1), · · · ,σ(−n)
)
. (5.2)
Then, by taking summation of the both sides of the stationary condition with respect to σ−a,































































αb(−1),··· ,b(−n) ⟨sb(−1) (σ(t+ n− 1)) · · · sb(−n) (σ(t))⟩
(st) . (5.6)
This is memory-n ZD strategy. In other words, in memory-n ZD strategies, linear relations
between correlation functions of payoffs during time span n are unilaterally enforced.
Constructing useful examples of memory-n ZD strategies with n≥ 2 in the prisoner’s dilemma











In this paper, we extended the concept of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games to
memory-two strategies. Memory-two ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relations between
correlation functions of payoffs and payoffs at the previous round. We provided examples of
memory-two ZD strategies in prisoner’s dilemma game. Some of them can be regarded as
variants of TFT strategy. We also discussed that extension of ZD strategies to memory-n (n≥ 2)
case is straightforward.
Before ending this paper, we make two remarks. First, in our numerical simulations, we
investigated only simple situations which correspond to well-mixed populations and without
evolutionary behavior. It has been known that evolutionary behavior can drastically change when
populations are structured [50–52]. Therefore, investigating performance of our variants of the
TFT strategy in evolutionary game theory in well-mixed populations and structured populations
is an important future problem.
Second remark is related to the length of memory. Recently, it has been found that long memory
can promote cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game [53,54]. Our variants of the TFT strategy
may promote cooperation because they are constructed based on TFT. Furthermore, as discussed
in Section 4, ETFT has several properties in common with TFT-ATFT [42], which is successful
under implementation errors. Investigating which extension of TFT is the most successful is a
significant problem. Additionally, whether TFT-ATFT is memory-two ZD strategy or not should
be studied.
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